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SECTION 2401(B) RECONFIGURED: IRWIN V.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS LEADS TO
THE RIGHT RESULT FOR THE WRONG REASONS
Elana Wexler*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that "X," a close family member, is admitted to a veterans'
hospital for alcohol-related treatment.1 Only a few days after X's admission
to the hospital, he suffers an apparent life-threatening cardiac event, and the
doctors at the hospital tell you that X is close to death from natural causes
and no medical intervention can save his life. X dies a few days later. His
death certificate states that X died of heart-related conditions, including
myocardial infarction. Six months after X's death, government
investigators contact you and inform you that they want to exhume X for the
purpose of resolving some suspicions that they have with the high number
of deaths at the hospital where he was treated and subsequently died. You
assent to the investigators' request to exhume X. Following the autopsy,
investigators tell you that X's death certificate is inaccurate in attributing his
death to a heart attack. The investigators still equivocate, however, as to
whether X died of natural or unnatural causes. The government provides
you with no other information regarding X's death, but promises to keep
you informed about the progress of the investigation. Despite your
attempts, you are unsuccessful in gaining additional information about X's
death. A year and a half after X's death, the Assistant U.S. Attorney meets
with you to inform you that a chemical inexplicably has been discovered in
X's body, but that further investigation is needed to determine whether the
chemical was lawfully or unlawfully administered. Several months after
this meeting and more than two years after X's death, investigators tell you
for the first time that X had been poisoned by the chemical while at the
hospital. Within two years of learning of X's poisoning, you pursue
administrative remedies. The administrative agency denies your claims,
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Benjamin Zipursky for his guidance with this Note. I would also like to thank my family,
friends, and Marc for their continuous support and encouragement. This Note is dedicated to
the memory of Vanessa Ilana Han (1989-2005), an incredible person whose life was cut
short but whose love of life, and famous words "you always miss 100% of the shots you
don't take," inspire me everyday.
1. This scenario is based upon Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2003).
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and you subsequently commence a wrongful death action against the United
States in federal district court.
As a matter of fairness, does it make sense to require you, as the plaintiff,
to demonstrate that you were diligent in ascertaining sufficient information
about your claim and therefore have filed your claim with the
administrative agency in accordance with applicable time limitations? Does
it make more sense to require the United States, as the defendant, to show
that you failed to exercise reasonable diligence in pursuing your claim and
therefore have not complied with applicable time limitations?
It is well settled that the United States, as a sovereign nation, is immune
from suit unless it specifically consents to be sued.2 The Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FTCA") 3 expressly waives the United States's immunity from
suits in tort and permits individuals to bring suit against the federal
government for personal injuries and property damages "caused by the
negligent or wrongful act[s] or omission[s] of' government employees. 4
Before bringing suit against the United States, individuals must first file
their claims with "the appropriate Federal agenc[ies] within two years after
such claim[s] accrue[]. ' '5 Prior to 1990, courts uniformly viewed this two-
year time requirement for presenting claims to administrative agencies as a
jurisdictional hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome before federal district courts
could hear their cases. 6 In addition, courts viewed this time requirement as
nonwaivable and not subject to equitable tolling. 7
In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Irwin v. Department of Veterans
Affairs that there was a rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling in suits
brought against the federal government. 8 Interpreting Irwin, the U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the Third and Eighth Circuits have subsequently held
that the two-year limitations period in the FTCA is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite, but instead an affirmative defense. 9 These courts maintain that
the filing requirement under the FTCA is not jurisdictional because, if it
2. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States
v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)); United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (1 How.) 286,
287-88 (1846).
3. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 2401-2402, 2411-2412, 2671-
2472, 2674-2480 (2000).
4. Id. § 1346(b)(1).
5. Id. § 2401(b); see id. § 2675(a); Garza v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 284 F.3d 930, 934
(8th Cir. 2002).
6. See infra Part I.B.3.
7. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Bernal v. United States, 907 F.2d 246, 248 (1st Cir. 1990); see
also Richard Parker, Is the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling Applicable to the Limitations
Periods in the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 135 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1992). Equitable tolling is
"[tihe doctrine that the statute of limitations will not bar a claim if the plaintiff, despite
diligent efforts, did not discover the injury until after the limitations period had expired."
Black's Law Dictionary 579 (8th ed. 2004).
8. Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990); see infra Part I.B.4.
9. See, e.g., Motley v. United States, 295 F.3d 820, 822 (8th Cir. 2002); Hughes v,
United States, 263 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2001); Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639,
640 (8th Cir. 1991); see also Arthur v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 2d 431, 434 (E.D. Pa.
2003); Diltz v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 95, 97 (D. Del. 1991); infra Part I.C.2.
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were, courts would be unable to employ the doctrine of equitable tolling,
and Irwin categorically stated that equitable tolling is permissible in suits
against the government.' 0 In contrast to the view of the Third and Eighth
Circuits, federal courts in the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have
continued to view the limitations period in the FTCA as jurisdictional,
rather than as an affirmative defense."I These courts hold that Irwin does
not change the fact that statutes of limitations in statutes that waive
sovereign immunity are jurisdictional by nature.1 2 In applying the FTCA,
courts have struggled with the implications of the statute of limitations as
provided by § 2401(b) of the FTCA. 13 This Note examines the debate over
how § 2401(b) ought to be construed. 14
Part I of this Note examines the history and development of the United
States's liability for the tortious acts or omissions of its employees. Part II
explores the conflict over the meaning of § 2401(b). Finally, Part III argues
that although Irwin does not render § 2401(b) an affirmative defense, both
the text of the FTCA and traditional notions of statutes of limitations
compel courts to construe § 2401(b) as an affirmative defense.
I. THE UNITED STATES'S LIABILITY FOR TORTIOUS ACTS COMMITTED BY
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
For more than 150 years, the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred
individuals from bringing tort suits against the United States government.
This Part discusses the development of the United States's liability for the
tortious acts or omissions committed by governmental employees. Part I.A
examines the doctrine of sovereign immunity from the English feudal
system to its adoption in the United States. Part I.B describes the FTCA,
which allows private litigants to sue the United States for injuries caused by
the tortious acts of its employees. Part I.B also discusses the impact of the
10. Schmidt, 933 F.2d at 640; see Motley, 295 F.3d at 822; Hughes, 263 F.3d at 278; see
also infra Part II.B. 1.
11. See, e.g., Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 71 (1st Cir. 2003); Gonzalez v.
United States, 284 F.3d 281, 287 (1st Cir. 2002); Rush v. Lock, 19 F. App'x 416, 418 (7th
Cir. 2001); Kokotis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 223 F.3d 275, 278 (4th Cir. 2000); Ahmed v. United
States, 30 F.3d 514, 516 (4th Cir. 1994); Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d 776, 779 (1st
Cir. 1992); Gonzalez-Bernal, 907 F.2d at 248; see also infra Part I.C. 1.
12. See, e.g., Kokotis, 223 F.3d at 278, 280; see also infra Part II.A.1. Many district
courts also continued to hold that § 2401 (b) is a jurisdictional prerequisite. See, e.g., Johnson
v. United States, No. EP-02-CA-580, 2005 WL 1605822, at *7 n.31 (W.D. Tex. June 30,
2005); Johnson v. United States, 906 F. Supp. 1100, 1108-09 (S.D. W. Va. 1995); Willis v.
United States, 879 F. Supp. 889, 891 (C.D. Ill. 1994).
13. See Skwira, 344 F.3d at 71 & n.8; see also Rodriguez v. Potter, No. Civ. A. H-03-
5325, 2005 WL 2030838, at *1 n.3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2005).
14. Ugo Colella and Adam Bain have noted that "courts have inconsistently allocated
the burden of proof for [Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")] jurisdictional issues-
sometimes imposing it on plaintiffs, sometimes on the United States... [and thus,] have
rendered non-uniform an area of FTCA law that ought to be driven by one approach to
allocation." Ugo Colella & Adam Bain, The Burden of Proving Jurisdiction Under the




Supreme Court's decision in Irwin, which impelled certain courts of appeals
to change their views on the nature of the FTCA's statute of limitations.
Finally, Part I.C introduces the circuit split concerning § 240 1(b).
A. The History of Sovereign Immunity in the United States
Derived from the English feudal system, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity completely protected the government from suit for centuries. 15
Under the feudal system, "[t]he king, being at the pinnacle ... was by the
nature of the system subject to no court at all."16 This section describes the
doctrine of sovereign immunity and its meaning both at English common
law and in the United States. This section also provides an overview of the
criticisms of applying the doctrine in the United States.
1. The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity: The English Feudal System
Under English common law, the English maxim that "'the king [could]
do no wrong' was universally accepted. 17 Throughout the English feudal
period, "[t]he lord of each manor held court for his subjects, but was
himself never subject to the jurisdiction of his own court." 18 Even as the
feudal system began to recede, the king remained omnipotent and immune
from suit. 19 Furthermore, "[w]hen the king's power declined, the fiction of
the unity of crown and state persisted, and the fact that the king traditionally
had not been subject to judicial sanctions provided a foundation for the
doctrine of immunity for the English government." 20
The English maxim did not stand for the proposition that the king was
incapable of wrongdoing, but only that the king could not be sued for
wrongdoing. 21 Even in fourteenth-century England it was recognized that
the king could commit an illegal act.22 Yet, under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, the king could never be included as a defendant in an action.23
Furthermore, the king could not be held liable for the tortious acts of the
Crown's employees because "to impute liability in tort to the State [for such
acts] would be to impute tort to the King who '[could] do no wrong.' 24
Only if the king gave consent to being sued for wrongdoing could he
15. See Developments in the Law: Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials,
70 Harv. L. Rev. 827, 829 (1957) [hereinafter Developments].
16. Id.
17. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 342 (1879); see United States v.
Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489 (1878).
18. Developments, supra note 15, at 829 ("A lord was subject only to the court of a
noble higher than he in the feudal hierarchy.").
19. See id. at 829-30.
20. Id. at 830.
21. See Langford, 101 U.S. at 343; Herbert Barry, The King Can Do No Wrong, 11 Va.
L. Rev. 349, 353 (1925).
22. See Developments, supra note 15, at 829.
23. See United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489 (1878).
24. Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 Yale L.J. 1, 37
n.20 (1926) (citations omitted).
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become a defendant in English Courts of Law or Equity.25 In the absence
of permission from the king, individuals injured as a result of the negligent
acts or omissions of the king's employees could seek redress only from the
employees directly. 26
2. Adoption of Sovereign Immunity in the United States
After the Revolutionary War, as the colonies gained independence, each
embraced the doctrine of sovereign immunity that previously had belonged
to the king. 27 When the colonies adopted the U.S. Constitution, the United
States government gained the benefit of sovereign immunity as well. 28 The
Supreme Court declared that the common law doctrine prohibiting a
sovereign from being "sued in his own courts without his consent ... is
equally applicable to the supreme authority of the nation, the United
States." 29  In Hill v. United States, the Supreme Court held that "[n]o
maxim is thought better established, or more universally assented to, than
that which ordains that a sovereign, or a government representing the
sovereign, cannot.., be amenable to its own creatures or agents employed
under its own authority for the fulfillment merely of its own legitimate
ends."30  The Court stated that, for public policy reasons, allowing the
25. Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850) ("[A]n attempt to overrule or
to impair [the maxim] on a foundation independently of such permission must involve an
inconsistency and confusion, both in theory and practice, subversive of regulated order or
power.").
26. See Developments, supra note 15, at 830.
27. See Thompson, 98 U.S. at 489-90. The English king, as a personal ruler, was
"merely the agent of the sovereign" while the sovereign in the United States "has from the
beginning been separated from the government." Borchard, supra note 24, at 38.
Nevertheless,
[tlhe substitution of popular for kingly sovereignty has ... effected no change
in the theory of suitability or responsibility, and notwithstanding the difference
between State and government, principal and agent, and the supposed control of
the "rule of law" and constitutional limitations, the sovereignty of the people
becomes in practical operation the sovereignty of the government.
Id. at 39.
28. See Barry, supra note 21, at 358-59.
29. The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1868). Professor Kenneth Culp Davis cites
Justice Horace Gray's dissenting opinion in United States v. Lee as providing the best
argument in favor of sovereign immunity:
"The maxim is not limited to a monarchy, but is of equal force in a republic. In the
one, as in the other, it is essential to the common defence and general welfare that
the sovereign should not, without its consent, be dispossessed by judicial process
of forts, arsenals, military posts, and ships of war, necessary to guard the national
existence against insurrection and invasion; of customs-houses and revenue
cutters, employed in the collection of the revenue; or of light-houses and light-
ships, established for the security of commerce with foreign nations and among the
different parts of the country."
Kenneth Culp Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 Admin. L. Rev. 383, 393 (1970)
(quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 226 (1882) (Gray, J., dissenting)). Davis then
states that "[i]f the government were 'dispossessed' of its military bases and equipment
during an emergency, surely the judicial interference could be harmful." Id.
30. Hill, 50 U.S. (9 How.) at 389.
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government to be sued would undermine the executive functions of the
government.3 1
The doctrine of sovereign immunity renders the United States immune
from suit unless the United States expressly consents to be sued.32
Therefore, individuals who institute suits against the government "must
bring [their] case[s] within the authority of some act of Congress. '33 In
addition, the United States's consent to suit "must be strictly observed and
exceptions ... are not to be implied. '34
Sovereign immunity, however, does not protect government officers
from suit.3 5 Government officers "are answerable, as private individuals,
for wrongs committed even in the course of their official work, just as a
private agent is answerable for a wrong committed by him on behalf or at
the command of his principal. '36 Thus, individuals injured by government
officers may bring private actions directly against those officers. 37 In
determining whether or not such injured persons are entitled to any award
of damages, courts must determine whether the government employees'
conduct which caused the injuries was legally authorized. 38 In addition to
seeking remedies at law, individuals injured by government officers can
seek equitable remedies, including injunctions. 39 In both law and equity,
government officers are answerable as private individuals for conduct that
injures others. 40
31. See id. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that "the public service would be
hindered, and the public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to
suit at the instance of every citizen, and consequently controlled in the use and disposition of
the means required for the proper administration of the government." The Siren, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) at 154; see also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704
(1949) (stating that "'the interference of the Courts with the performance of the ordinary
duties of the executive departments of the government, would be productive of nothing but
mischief" (quoting Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 516 (1840))). Davis states
that, in Larson, the Supreme Court asserted a "clearly false proposition that interference of
the courts with ordinary duties of executive departments would produce nothing but
mischief." Davis, supra note 29, at 394. Instead, argues Davis, the "Court should have said
that experience had proved overwhelmingly that a limited scope of judicial review of
ordinary duties of executive departments produces better government." Id.
32. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980).
33. The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 154.
34. Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957) (citing United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1941)).
35. Clark Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review:
Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1479, 1480 (1962).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1480-81.
38. See id. at 1481 ("The plaintiff cannot sue to redress merely any unauthorized action
by an officer."). In providing "[a] classic statement of the theory and operation of
nonstatutory review," Professor Clark Byse notes that to seek redress from an officer, a
"Plaintiff must allege conduct by the officer which, if not justified by his official authority, is
a private wrong to the plaintiff, entitling the latter to recover damages." Id. at 1480-81.




3. Criticisms of Sovereign Immunity in the United States
Although the doctrine of sovereign immunity has a long history, many
scholars argue that sovereign immunity should be abolished because it
yields a substantial amount of injustice.41  As the role of the federal
government expanded, the number of tortious acts committed by
government employees increased, yet those injured by these tortious acts
could not commence lawsuits against the federal government solely because
the employer of the tortfeasors was the federal government; if these
tortfeasors had been employees of private companies, persons injured could
have sought redress in the court system. 42 Persons injured by government
employees could apply to Congress for private bills of relief, but the
process was expensive for individuals and burdensome to Congress.43
Early criticisms of the doctrine focused on the difficulty inherent in
applying a nonfederal concept to a federal government. Professor Edwin
Borchard, for example, noted that the English king, as a personal ruler, was
"merely the agent of the sovereign" while the sovereign in the United States
"has from the beginning been separated from the government. 44
In the decades following the FTCA's enactment, scholars further
developed this early criticism of sovereign immunity. Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky argues that the doctrine of sovereign immunity "is an
anachronistic relic" that has no place in American society.45 According to
Chemerinsky, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which is based on the
English maxim that "the King can do no wrong," is fundamentally
inconsistent with the American view of government and with the
Constitution.46 The United States federal government is premised both "on
41. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1201,
1203 (2001) (stating that no government, regardless of whether at the federal, state, or local
level, "should be accorded sovereign immunity in any court"); Davis, supra note 29, at 383
& n. 1; John E. H. Sherry, The Myth that the King Can Do No Wrong: A Comparative Study
of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in the United States and New York Court of Claims, 22
Admin. L. Rev. 39, 58 (1969) (stating that sovereign immunity "is not only anachronistic but
also dangerous to our democratic institutions if allowed to exist untrammeled by controls
appropriate to contain it"). Furthermore,
[e]ven though all will agree that the government as a litigant differs from a private
corporation or an individual in that it represents the community as a whole, and
that the government clearly ought not to be stopped by 'any plaintiff who presents
a disputed question,' the crucial question is whether a private party who asserts
that a government officer is wrongly interfering with his legal rights may have a
judicial determination of the dispute between the private party and the officer.
Davis, supra note 29, at 394.
42. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-40 (1950).
43. See id. at 140 ("The volume of these private bills, the inadequacy of congressional
machinery for determination of facts, the importunities to which claimants subjected
members of Congress, and the capricious results, led to a strong demand that claims for tort
wrongs be submitted to adjudication."); H.R. Rep. No. 76-2428, at 2 (1940).
44. Borchard, supra note 24, at 38.
45. Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 1201. Although courts have consistently applied the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, they have often done so without any justification. See id
46. Id. at 1202.
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a rejection of a monarchy and of royal prerogatives," 47 and on "the
fundamental recognition that the government and government officials can
do wrong and must be held accountable." 4 8 Article VI of the Constitution
provides that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall
be the supreme Law of the Land."'49 Despite this clear declaration,
sovereign immunity, which is not ingrained in the Constitution,
50
undermines the Constitution by barring "suits for relief against government
entities." 5 1 Chemerinsky contends that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
violates the fundamental maxim that "no one, not even the government, is
above the law." 52  Consequently, "rt]he judicial role of enforcing and
upholding the Constitution is rendered illusory when the government has
complete immunity to suit."'53
In addressing the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court
repeatedly "has asserted that courts cannot 'interfere with the public
administration' 54 ... [or] that 'the Government... cannot be stopped in its
tracks."' 55 Yet, this justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity
does not stand, according to Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, because
"courts[,] including the Supreme Court[,] are constantly interfering with the
public administration and constantly stopping the government in its
tracks." 56
47. Id. (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 9). Article I, Section 9, of the United States
Constitution provides that "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States." U.S.
Const. art. I, § 9.
48. Chemerinskv, supra note 41, at 1202. Chemerinsky argues that "sovereign
immunity undermines the basic principle, announced in Marburv v. Madison, that 'rtlhe very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."' Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
49. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
50. See Chemerinskv, supra note 41, at 1202 ("Nowhere does the [Constitution] mention
or even imply that governments have complete immunity to suit.").
51. Id.
52. Id. ("The effect of sovereign immunity is to place the government above the law and
to ensure that some individuals who have suffered egregious harms will be unable to receive
redress for their injuries.").
53. Id.
54. Dugan v. Rank, 373 U.S. 609, 620 (1963), quoted in Davis, supra note 29, at 401.
55. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949), quoted
in Davis, supra note 29, at 401.
56. Larson, 337 U.S. at 704. For example, in 1918, in Hammer v. Dagenhart, the
Supreme Court enjoined the U.S. Attorney and the entire federal government from enforcing
a 1916 statute which attempted to prohibit interstate shipment of products manufactured
through child labor. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), discussed in Davis, supra note 29, at 401.
Professor Davis provides another example of the Supreme Court's efforts to limit
government activity: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952),
discussed in Davis, supra note 29, at 402. After President Truman seized the steel mills in
an effort to prevent "a strike that he believed would jeopardize national defense," the
Supreme Court ruled that Truman's seizure was beyond the President's constitutional power.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579. Davis states that it is
utterly incongruous for the courts to stop the President and Congress in their tracks
and to interfere in the public administration of the most vital programs and at the
same time to recite and hold that sovereign immunity prevents stopping the
SECTION 2401(B) RECONFIGURED
4. United States's Waiver of Sovereign Immunity for Tortious Acts of
Government Employees
Although the principle of sovereign immunity remained inviolate for
common law tort actions from the ratification of the U.S. Constitution in
1789 until 1946, when Congress passed the FTCA, 57 Congress did waive
the United States's sovereign immunity in certain other situations. 58 For
example, in the 1920s, Congress consented to suits against the federal
government for certain admiralty and maritime torts.59
Prior to the passage of the FTCA, individuals who were injured by the
acts or omissions of government employees could only bring suit against
the government employees themselves, not against the federal
government. 60 In a 1922 case, the Supreme Court held that the United
States could not be held liable in tort, reasoning that "[t]he United States
[had] not consented to be sued for torts... [and] a tort is a tort in a legal
sense only because the law has made it so." '61
As the American jurisdictional system developed, people became
increasingly dissatisfied with the doctrine of sovereign immunity.62
Consequently, Congress passed the FTCA in 1946.63
B. The Federal Tort Claims Act
The FTCA "waives, with certain limitations, governmental immunity to
suit in tort and permits suits on tort claims to be brought against the United
States." 64 For plaintiffs to sue the United States in tort, they must comply
with the two-year limitations period provided in § 2401(b). 65 This section
describes the provisions of the FTCA, with a particular emphasis on the
time limitations imposed by § 2401(b). This section also explains that
courts consistently held that § 2401(b) was a jurisdictional prerequisite until
the Supreme Court's ruling in Irwin, which held that statutes of limitations
in waiver of sovereign immunity statutes could be equitably tolled. 66
government in its tracks or interfering in public administration when a single
officer is claiming a pile of coal or a piece of land and when the government has
no special program with respect to the coal or the land!
Davis, supra note 29, at 402 (emphasis omitted).
57. See Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
58. See H.R. Rep. No. 76-2428, at 2 (1940). By creating the Court of Claims in 1855,
Congress waived the United States's immunity from suits in contract, permitting individuals
to bring suit against the federal government for "[g]ovemmental responsibility in contract."
Davis, supra note 29, at 385.
59. H.R. Rep. No. 76-2428, at 2.
60. See Developments, supra note 15, at 830.
61. The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922).
62. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950).
63. See Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
64. S. Rep. No. 79-1400, at 29 (1946).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000).
66. See Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990).
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1. The Provisions of the FTCA
The FTCA expressly waives the United States's immunity from suits
sounding in tort, thereby allowing individuals to bring suit against the
government for personal injuries and property damages "caused by the
negligent or wrongful act[s] or omission[s] of... employee[s] of the
Government while acting within the scope of [their] office[s] or
employment. '67 The FTCA defines "' [e]mployee of the government"' as:
(1) officers or employees of any federal agency, members of the military
or naval forces of the United States, members of the National Guard while
engaged in training or duty under section 115, 316, 502, 503, 504, or 505
of title 32, and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official
capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States,
whether with or without compensation, and (2) any officer or employee of
a Federal public defender organization, except when such officer or
employee performs professional services in the course of providing
representation under section 3006A of title 18.68
For persons injured by the tortious acts of federal government employees,
the FTCA is the exclusive means available for suing the federal
government. 69
The underlying purpose of the FTCA was to create fairness for
individuals allegedly injured by employees of the United States
government. 70 The FTCA sought to balance Congress's interest in limiting
the burdensome process of "considering and disposing of private claims," 71
with claimants' interest in obtaining damages for injuries caused by
government employees' negligent acts or omissions. 72 Under the FTCA as
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The FTCA does not cover certain actions, including the
following: United States employees acting within their discretionary authority; Postal
Service employees' actions affecting the transmission of mail; seizure of property pursuant
to tax or customs duty; admiralty; the establishment of a quarantine; intentional torts
including "assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights"; "fiscal
operations of the Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system"; "combatant
activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war"; and actions
"arising in a foreign country." Id. § 2680(h), (i)-(k).
68. Id. § 2671 ("[M]ember[s] of the military or naval forces.., or... member[s] of the
National Guard," act "'within the scope of [their] office[s] or employment' . . . [while] "in
the line of duty."). Determining whether individuals are in fact employees of the
government is a question of federal law. See Brooks v. A. R. & S. Enters., 622 F.2d 8, 10
(1 st Cir. 1980). Independent contractors for the government are not deemed "'employees of
the government."' See id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2671).
69. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. United States, No. 3:05 CV 7038, 2005 WL 1863827,
at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 4, 2005).
70. See S. Rep. No. 79-1400, at 30 (1946).
71. Id. Individuals have always been able to seek redress by introducing private bills in
Congress, "but such bills place a severe strain upon the legislative process." Developments,
supra note 15, at 887-88.
72. S. Rep. No. 79-1400, at 30. It has been noted that "private bills cannot provide
impartial and uniform compensation, and the courts are generally a more suitable forum for
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it was originally enacted in 1946, claimants were permitted to bring their
tort claims against the United States as long as such claims were brought
"within one year after such claim[s] accrued. ' 73 Claimants were also not
required to present their tort claims to federal agencies before filing suit in
federal district court.74 In 1949, Congress amended the FTCA to extend the
one-year statute of limitations to two years,75 and in 1966 Congress further
amended the FTCA to make mandatory the requirement that plaintiffs first
present their claims to the appropriate federal agencies.
76
To sue the United States in tort, individuals must strictly comply with the
limitations period as provided in § 2401(b): "[T]ort claim[s] against the
United States shall be forever barred unless [they are] presented in writing
to the appropriate Federal agenc[ies] within two years after such claim[s]
accrue[] .... ",77 To meet the requirements of § 2401(b), individuals must
present to the appropriate federal agency either a completed Standard Form
95 ("SF 95")78 or some other written statement which describes the claim in
sufficient detail, so that the agency can commence its own investigation, as
well as the amount of damages sought. 79 Only if the agencies to which the
the adjudicatory process of determining the liability of the United States in tort."
Developments, supra note 15, at 888.
73. See Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, § 420, 60 Stat. 842, 845 (1946) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 240 1(b)).
74. See id. (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). As Ugo Colella and Adam Bain
noted, "if a claim was submitted to an agency within one year of accrual, the claimant had
six months after the claim was denied or withdrawn by the claimant to file suit in federal
court." Ugo Colella & Adam Bain, Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort Claims
Act: Putting the Legislative History in Proper Perspective, 31 Seton Hall L. Rev. 174, 178
(2000); see Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, § 420, 60 Stat. 842, 845 (1946) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)).
75. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 81-55, 63 Stat. 62 (1949) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)). The reasoning behind this amendment was that "[t]he 1-year
existing period [was] unfair to some claimants who suffered injuries which did not fully
develop until after the expiration of the period for making claim." S. Rep. No. 81-135, at 2
(1949). For example, "the wide area of operations of the Federal agencies, particularly the
armed service agencies, would increase the possibility that notice of the wrongful death of a
deceased to his next of kin would be so long delayed in going through channels of
communication that the notice would arrive at a time when the running of the statute had
already barred the institution of a claim or suit." Id. The Committee on the Judiciary stated
that extending the statute of limitations to two years was not likely to either "unnecessarily
vex the agencies concerned, [or] ... foster a lack of diligence on the part of claimants in the
prosecution of their claims." Id.; H.R. Rep. No. 81-276, at 4 (1949).
76. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 89-506, § 2, 80 Stat. 306, 306 (1966) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); see Garza v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 284 F.3d 930, 934 (8th
Cir. 2002). As a general rule, tort claims "accrue" at the time of injury. Attallah v. United
States, 955 F.2d 776, 779 (1st Cir. 1992). But see infra notes 87-100 and accompanying
text.
78. Standard Form 95-Claim for Damage, Injury or Death,
http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/forms/forms.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) (requiring claimants
to provide appropriate federal agencies with both bases for their claims by stating in detail
the "facts and circumstances attending the damage[s], injur[ies], or death[s], identifying
persons and property involved, the place[s] of occurrence," and the amount of damages
sought in dollars).
79. See Ahmed v. United States, 30 F.3d 514, 516-17 (4th Cir. 1994).
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claims are presented send individuals "by certified or registered mail,...
notice[s] of final denial of the claim[s]" can individuals subsequently file
their claims against the United States in federal district court.80 At this
stage, the United States is substituted for the previously named federal
employees.81 For those claims that are denied by the federal agencies,
individuals have six months to sue the United States in federal district
court.
8 2
The FTCA allows the United States to be liable for tortious acts "in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances." 83 Thus, the United States is liable only "where the United
States, if a private party, would be liable under the law of the place where
the tort occurred."'84
2. Implications of § 2401(b) as a Jurisdictional Prerequisite
Whether the two-year statute of limitations 85 provided in § 2401(b) is a
jurisdictional prerequisite or an affirmative defense has two important
ramifications for the parties in FTCA actions: (1) It establishes which party
must plead the statute of limitations; and (2) it establishes which party bears
the burden of proving the statute of limitations should it become an issue in
an action.86
The Supreme Court in United States v. Kubrick declared that for
purposes of determining when a claim accrues in the context of medical
malpractice a "discovery rule" applies: Claims "accrue" when injured
parties "know[] both the existence and the cause of rtheir] injur[ies]. ' '87
The "cause of [their] injur[ies]," as referred to above, does not require that
plaintiffs actually know that they have been injured as a result of
negligence. 88  Once plaintiffs have discovered sufficient relevant facts
80. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a). If claimants do not receive responses from the
federal agencies within six months of filing, their claims are deemed final denials under the
FTCA. See id. § 2675(a).
81. See id. § 2679(d)(1). Thus, "[fthe statute grants jurisdiction to the district courts."
Byse, supra note 35, at 1518.
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Individuals who bring their claims in federal district court
have no right to jury trials. Id. § 2402.
83. Id. § 2674.
84. Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d 776, 782 (1st Cir. 1992); see Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1962); Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 180-81 (1956);
Dumansky v. United States, 486 F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (D.N.J. 1980).
85. A statute of limitations is defined as "a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a
civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued." Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 7,
at 1450-51.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 101-08. It is possible, however, that even if §
2401(b) is an affirmative defense, plaintiffs will have to rebut the government's contention
that their cases are time barred by proving compliance with § 2401(b). For an interesting
discussion of the burden shifting implicated by § 2401(b), see Colella & Bain, supra note 14.
87. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 113 (1979); see id. at 117.
88. See Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 76 (1st Cir. 2003).
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about their injuries, they are considered to know the source of their
injuries. 89
In Kubrick, the plaintiff entered a Veterans' Administration hospital
seeking treatment for an infection in his right leg.90 Doctors performed
surgery on the plaintiff and then irrigated the infected area with neomycin,
an antibiotic.91 About six weeks after he was discharged from the hospital,
the plaintiff noticed loss of hearing, which an ear specialist later diagnosed
as bilateral nerve deafness. 92 Other specialists confirmed this diagnosis and
one specialist stated that it was highly likely that neomycin caused the
plaintiffs hearing loss.93 The Court found that the plaintiff's claim was
time-barred under the FTCA because he filed his claim more than two years
after the claim accrued, which was the date on which an ear specialist
informed plaintiff that his hearing loss was likely due to the neomycin
treatment. 94 The Court reasoned that this information provided plaintiff
with sufficient facts about the cause of his injury.95 If plaintiffs were
allowed to wait to file their claims until after they realized that their injuries
were negligently inflicted, "the purpose of the limitations statute, which is
to require the reasonably diligent presentation of tort claims against the
Government," would be undermined. 96
Courts of appeals have recognized that the rationale of Kubrick's
discovery rule may apply outside of the medical malpractice context. 97 But
plaintiffs may be better able to discern government involvement in cases of
possible medical malpractice where the plaintiff was treated in a
government facility than in other contexts.98 Outside medical malpractice,
"plaintiffis] may have less reason to suspect governmental involvement." 99
With these differences in mind, courts of appeals have held that nonmedical
malpractice claims "accrue" when plaintiffs know or should know both of
their injuries and of facts sufficient for them to make a connection between
such injuries and government activity.100
89. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 124.
90. Id. at 113.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 114.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 115, 122.
95. Id. at 123.
96. Id. See id. at 120 n.7 for the Court's rationale of a discovery rule for medical
malpractice claims.
97. See Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 2003). The Skwira court noted
that in Lhotka v. United States, 114 F.3d 751, 753 (8th Cir. 1997), the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit applied the discovery rule to an action for trespass and nuisance, and
in Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1268-69 (7th Cir. 1980), the Seventh Circuit
applied the discovery rule to an action for an occupational safety hazard. Skwira, 344 F.3d at
74.
98. See Skwira, 344 F.3d at 77.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 78 (Nonmedical malpractice claims "accrue" when "plaintiffqs] know[], or in
the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, (1) of [their] injur[ies] and (2) sufficient
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Assume that § 2401(b) requires that plaintiffs (1) allege in their
complaints facts from which district courts can infer that the statute of
limitations has been met; and (2) bear the burden of proving compliance
with § 2401(b). If the United States moves to dismiss plaintiffs' claims
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("FRCP"), 101 alleging that district courts lack jurisdiction over the matters
therein, in order to prove compliance with § 2401(b), plaintiffs would have
to demonstrate that they acted diligently in filing their claims with the
appropriate federal agencies. 10 2  Now assume instead that § 2401(b)
requires that the United States (1) plead the statute of limitations in its
answer or in a motion to dismiss; and (2) bear the burden of proving that
plaintiffs failed to comply with the statute of limitations.10 3 If the United
States moves to dismiss plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 10 4 the
United States would have to prove plaintiffs' failure to comply with §
2401(b) by showing that plaintiffs did not act diligently in filing their
claims with the appropriate federal agencies. 105
It is settled law that plaintiffs bear the burden of proving jurisdictional
matters, 106 whereas defendants bear the burden of proving affirmative
defenses. 10 7 A jurisdictional prerequisite is a requirement that must be
facts to permit ... reasonable person[s] to believe that there is a causal connection between
the government and [their] injur[ies].").
101. If a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the defendant
moves pursuant to 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"). Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(1).
102. See, e.g., Gould v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 738, 745-46 (4th
Cir. 1990).
103. See Hughes v. United States, 263 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that because
§ 2401(b) is an affirmative defense, "it is the defendant's burden to establish the date when
the plaintiff knew, or reasonably should have known, of the cause of his injury").
104. If a defendant moves to dismiss based, for example, on the affirmative defense of the
statute of limitations, the defendant moves pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the FRCP. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
105. See Hughes, 263 F.3d at 278.
106. See, e.g., McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189
(1936).
107. See Motley v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1131 (E.D. Mo. 2001) (because
§ 2401(b) is an affirmative defense, "the burden is on the government to prove.., that
plaintiffs failed to comply with the limitations period"); Black's Law Dictionary, supra note
7, at 451 ("defendant bears the burden of proving an affirmative defense"). While Ugo
Colella and Adam Bain recognize that § 2401(b) is a jurisdictional condition on the FTCA's
waiver of immunity, they do not believe that this necessarily means that plaintiffs must bear
the burden of "demonstrating that a federal district court has jurisdiction to entertain the
FTCA suit." Colella & Bain, supra note 14, at 2864. Colella and Bain question whether
§ 2401(b) is purely jurisdictional, thus requiring the FTCA plaintiff to demonstrate that a
federal court can hear the FTCA suit or whether § 2401(b) is an affirmative defense,
"imposing on the United States the burden of proving a lack of subject matter jurisdiction."
Id. The authors conclude that § 2401(b) is a jurisdictional prerequisite and present a
framework for determining whether the requirements in § 2401(b) have been met. Id. at
2866, 2917. They contend that plaintiffs must allege in their complaints that the actions are
"jurisdictionally viable." Id. at 2866. If the United States government seeks to challenge the
courts' jurisdiction, the government must produce evidence sufficient for "a prima facie case
that the plaintiff[s] [have] failed to meet... the Act's jurisdictional condition[]." Id. at 2867.
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satisfied in order for a court to adjudicate the matter before it.10 8
Jurisdiction is "[a] court's power to decide a case." 10 9  For courts to
consider cases, plaintiffs' complaints must allege "the grounds upon which
the court[s'] jurisdiction depends." 10 It is well settled that such jurisdiction
must be based on either the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 11
An affirmative defense is "[a] defendant's assertion of facts and
arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiffs. . . claim, even if all the
allegations in the complaint are true."1 12 Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("FRCP"), defendants must affirmatively set forth either in a
responsive pleading or in a motion any affirmative defenses they have to
the allegations that plaintiffs assert. 113 Defendants waive their right to
assert affirmative defenses not raised in their answers or motions.1 14
3. Prior to 1990 Courts Consistently Viewed § 2401(b) as Jurisdictional
Prior to 1990, courts uniformly viewed § 2401(b) as a jurisdictional
prerequisite that plaintiffs had to satisfy in order to bring suit against the
United States under the FTCA: l l5 "'In any suit against the United States,
the statute of limitations is an integral part of the government's consent to
suit, and as such is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction that cannot be
waived."'1 6 In Gould v. United States Department of Health and Human
Services, the Fourth Circuit, in holding that § 2401(b) was jurisdictional,
If the government succeeds in establishing a prima facie case of lack of jurisdiction, then
plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion that the courts do have jurisdiction over their claims.
See id.
108. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
109. Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 7, at 867.
110. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
111. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
112. Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 7, at 451; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
113. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), 12(b).
114. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h).
115. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Bernal v. United States, 907 F.2d 246, 248 (1st Cir. 1990)
(stating that "filing of a timely administrative claim is a jurisdictional requirement that
cannot be waived"); Houston v. U.S. Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1987) (same);
Crawford v. United States, 796 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1986) (same); Henderson v. United
States, 785 F.2d 121, 123 (4th Cir. 1986) (same); Radman v. United States, 752 F.2d 343,
344 (8th Cir. 1985) (same); Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d 484, 485 (9th Cir. 1984)
(stating that § 240 1(b) "establishes two jurisdictional hurdles, both of which must be met");
Garrett v. United States, 640 F.2d 24, 26 (6th Cir. 1981) (stating that § 2401(b) is a "valid
[jurisdictional] condition[] under which suits may be maintained under the statute");
Klotzman v. United States, Civ. A. No. HAR-90-1377, 1990 WL 157519, at *2 (D. Md. Oct.
12, 1990) (stating that § 2401(b) is a jurisdictional condition to suit); see also Richard Parker
& Ugo Colella, Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort Claims Act: The Impact of
Brockamp and Beggerly, 29 Seton Hall L. Rev. 885, 887 (1999). For claims that are filed
more than two years after plaintiffs' "injuries" occur, the burden is on the plaintiffs to prove
that they fall "within an exception to the statute of limitations." Crawford, 796 F.2d at 929.
Prior to 1990, plaintiffs bore the burden of both pleading and proving compliance with
§ 2401(b). Daniel A. Morris, Federal Tort Claims § 3:2 (1993).
116. Crawford, 796 F.2d at 928 (quoting Walters v. Sec'y of Def., 725 F.2d 107, 112 n.12
(D.C. Cir. 1983)).
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reasoned that "[t]he terms of [the United States's] consent to be sued in any
court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 11 7 Moreover,
courts held that § 2401(b) "could not be construed to operate merely as
periods of limitation, but had to be interpreted as conditioning the
government's liability under the Act."'1 18
Furthermore, courts consistently held that equitable tolling could not
extend the time period prescribed by the FTCA within which administrative
claims must be filed."19 One rationale behind this view was that "the
purpose behind the FTCA's limitations periods-prompt presentation of
claims against the United States-[was] inconsistent with the doctrine of
equitable tolling."' 120 However, in Crawford v. United States, the Seventh
Circuit held that, although rare, equitable tolling could exist in suits against
the government. 121 In Crawford, a nineteen-year-old male, who was
mentally disabled, was injured when "he tripped over metal spikes that had
been left in the ground when a U.S. mailbox had been removed."' 122
Although Crawford was immediately treated for his injuries, he did not file
his claim with the Postal Service until more than four years passed after the
date on which he was injured. 123 Crawford's claims were denied by the
Postal Service. 124 Subsequently, he filed suit against the United States in
federal district court, arguing "that he lacked the mental capacity to
discover that the Postal Service had caused his injury" and therefore that the
statute of limitations in § 2401(b) was tolled. 125 The Seventh Circuit held
that, because Crawford had "[t]he burden of establishing that he was within
an exception to the statute of limitations[,] ... he had to prove ... that,
given his incapacity, he did not know and could not by reasonable diligence
have discovered that the cause of his accident was an act by the Postal
Service."' 126 Thus, since Crawford failed to make such proof, the court
could not entertain Crawford's suit. 12
7
117. Gould v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 738, 741 (4th Cir. 1990)
(citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)).
118. Morris, supra note 115, § 3:2.
119. See, e.g., Gould, 905 F.2d at 742 ("'[Sltrong equitable considerations
notwithstanding, the two-year limitation period of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) cannot be tolled or
waived."' (quoting Lien v. Beehner, 453 F. Supp. 604, 606 (N.D.N.Y. 1978))); Cogburn v.
United States, 717 F. Supp. 958, 960 (D. Mass. 1989) (noting that § 2401(b) is either a
jurisdictional prerequisite or is subject to equitable tolling).
120. Parker & Colella, supra note 115, at 892. In finding that the limitations periods
contained in § 2401(b) could not be equitably tolled, courts reasoned "that the FTCA
contained a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that is strictly construed, so that courts
were not at liberty to extend the time limitations in the FTCA beyond what Congress
expressly provided." Id.
121. See Crawford, 796 F.2d at 926-27.








4. Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs
Federal employment discrimination law provides that individuals can
commence private lawsuits against the government if they file their claims
in federal district court within a specified time period after receiving notice
of denial from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"). 128 In Irwin, the plaintiff filed his complaint in the federal
district court "44 days after the EEOC notice was received at his attorney's
office, but 29 days after the date on which he claimed [his attorney]
received the letter."'129 The plaintiff contended that the thirty-day period
did not begin to run until the plaintiff "[had] notice of his right to sue."' 130
Irwin's attorney was out of the country at the time that the EEOC's letter
arrived at his office, and Irwin therefore argued that the thirty-day period
did not begin to run until his attorney returned to his office and received
actual notice of the EEOC's denial. 13 1 The district court dismissed Irwin's
complaint on the ground that the "[d]istrict [c]ourt lacked jurisdiction
because the complaint was not filed within 30 days of the EEOC's
decision." 132 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal on the
ground that the filing period is jurisdictional, and therefore the district court
did not have the authority to consider Irwin's claims.' 33
In the Supreme Court, the plaintiff acknowledged that he filed his
complaint in federal district court more than thirty days after the EEOC's
letter was received at the office of Irwin's attorney, but the plaintiff asserted
that his failure to file within the thirty-day period should be "excused under
equitable tolling principles."' 134 The Court held that, while equitable tolling
can apply to lawsuits under Title VII, Irwin could not have the benefit of
equitable tolling, because his failure to file timely was due solely to
neglect.' 35  The Court stated that equitable tolling is extended only
sparingly. The Irwin court referred to only two instances in which equitable
tolling applies: (1) cases "where the claimant has actively pursued his
judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory
period"; 136 and (2) cases where the claimant "has been induced or tricked
by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass." 137
The Court declared that equitable tolling does not extend to situations
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (2000); Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89,
91 (1990). When Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs was decided, the time period was
thirty days. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 91.
129. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 91.





135. See id. at 95-96.
136. Id. at 96.
137. Id.
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where plaintiffs neglect to file timely claims merely as the result of a lack of
due diligence. 138
It is a well-settled principle that equitable tolling can apply to time
requirements in actions among private litigants. 139 In Irwin, the Court
announced "a general rule to govern the applicability of equitable tolling in
suits against the Government:"' 140 "[T]he same rebuttable presumption of
equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also
apply to suits against the United States."'141 The Court explained that
applying equitable tolling to statutes in which the government has waived
sovereign immunity, "amounts to little, if any, broadening of the
congressional waiver." 142
C. The Circuit Split on § 2401(b)
Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Irwin, courts of appeals have
interpreted Irwin differently. The majority of circuits, particularly the First,
Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, continue to view § 2401(b) as a jurisdictional
prerequisite, while the Third and Eighth Circuits, in light of Irwin, view
§ 2401(b) as an affirmative defense. This section briefly discusses these
competing views.
1. Section 2401(b) as a Jurisdictional Prerequisite
In the years following the Supreme Court's decision in Irwin, courts in
the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have continued to hold that §
2401(b) is a jurisdictional prerequisite with which individuals must comply
in order to bring actions against the government. 43 These courts argue that
Irwin did not change the view that § 2401(b) is jurisdictional. 144 Rather,
Irwin made it possible for limitations periods in suits against the
government to be equitably tolled. 1 45
In Skwira v. United States, a World War II veteran who was admitted to
the Veterans Affairs Medical Center ("VAMC") for treatment of alcoholism
died of apparent "natural causes" a few days after his admission."' 146
138. See id. ("Because the time limits imposed by Congress in a suit against the
Government involve a waiver of sovereign immunity, it is evident that no more favorable
tolling doctrine may be employed against the Government than is employed in suits between
private litigants.").
139. See id. at 95 (citing Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27 (1989)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 95-96.
142. Id. at 95.
143. See Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 71 & n.8 (1st Cir. 2003); Gonzalez v.
United States, 284 F.3d 281, 288 (1st Cir. 2002); Rush v. Lock, 19 F. App'x 416, 418 (7th
Cir. 2001); Kokotis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 223 F.3d 275, 278 (4th Cir. 2000); Ahmed v. United
States, 30 F.3d 514, 516 (4th Cir. 1994); Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d 776, 779 (1st
Cir. 1992); Gonzalez-Bernal v. United States, 907 F.2d 246, 248 (1st Cir. 1990).
144. See, e.g., Kokotis, 223 F.3d at 280.
145. See Willis v. United States, 879 F. Supp. 889, 891 (C.D. 111. 1994).
146. Skwira, 344 F.3d at 67.
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Almost a year after Skwira's death, government investigators contacted the
Skwira family and obtained permission to exhume Skwira in order to
investigate a suspicious increase in deaths at the VAMC. 147 Following the
autopsy, investigators told the Skwira family that "'the death certificate as
printed was incorrect,"' and although "Skwira 'didn't die of a heart
attack,' ... this 'did not mean that he did die of unnatural causes."'' 14 8
More than two years after Skwira's death, investigators "informed
[Skwira's family] for the first time that Skwira had... been poisoned [by
ketamine] while at the VAMC"' 149 and "died of epinephrine poisoning.' 150
Approximately a year after the Skwiras received this information, they filed
their notice of claim for wrongful death with the Department of Veterans
Affairs ("VA").'51 After their claim was denied by the VA, they filed suit
against the United States in federal district court, arguing, in response to the
United States's motion to dismiss, "that their claim did not accrue until...
they were told for the first time that Skwira had died as a result of an
illegally administered dose of epinephrine."' 152 The First Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal of the family's claim, declaring that the family
failed to comply with the jurisdictional prerequisite of § 2401(b) and thus
the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 15 3
The First Circuit held that the statute of limitations began to run
immediately after the autopsy when the Skwira family was informed that
the death certificate as printed was incorrect. 154 In rejecting the family's
contentions that their claims should have been equitably tolled, the First
Circuit implied that jurisdictional prerequisites and equitable tolling could
coexist, but held that, under the facts presented, the Skwira family's claims
were not subject to equitable tolling.' 55 Equitable tolling applies if "there
are no facts discoverable through the exercise of reasonable diligence which
would permit a plaintiff to reasonably believe that her injury is connected
with some act of the government."' 156 Such was not the case in Skwira.157
In the Fourth Circuit case Kokotis v. United States Postal Service, a
motorist sued the Postal Service for injuries she claimed were "due to the
negligence of a Postal Service employee."' 15 8 Although Kokotis filed her
claim with the Postal Service about one month after she sustained injuries,
147. Id. at 68.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 69.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 70.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 71.
154. Id. at 80.
155. See id. at 81.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. Kokotis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 223 F.3d 275, 277 (4th Cir. 2000).
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the SF 95 form that she submitted failed to include a sum certain. 159 More
than two years after the date of injury, Kokotis "submitted a revised SF 95
requesting a sum certain in the amount of $19,000.160 The Postal Service
denied Kokotis's claim on the ground that her claim was time barred. 161
Subsequently, Kokotis filed her claim in federal district court. 162 The
Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court's ruling that Kokotis's failure
to "identify a sum certain within the two-year statute of limitations deprived
it of jurisdiction over her suit." 16 3
2. Section 2401(b) as an Affirmative Defense
Courts in the Third and Eighth Circuits recognize that filing a claim with
the appropriate federal agency is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, yet
these courts hold that the timeliness of filing an administrative claim is an
affirmative defense.' 64 These circuits hold that, as a result of the Supreme
Court's holding in Irwin, the two-year limitations period pursuant to
§ 2401(b) is an affirmative defense. 165 These courts argue that § 2401(b)
cannot be jurisdictional because, if it were, courts would be unable to
employ the doctrine of equitable tolling, and Irwin categorically states that
equitable tolling is permissible in suits against the government. 166
In Hughes v. United States, doctors at the VAMC administered the blood
thinner heparin to the plaintiff in connection with plaintiffs cardiac
surgery. 167 After the operation but while Hughes was still unconscious, he
developed gangrene in all four of his limbs as a result of an allergic reaction
to heparin, and parts of all four limbs had to be amputated. 168 Upon
regaining consciousness, the doctors informed Hughes of his allergic
reaction to heparin, but the doctors failed to state that, had the reaction been
159. Id. at 278 ("Instead, the cover letter accompanying the form stated that Kokotis was






164. Azizi v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1060 (D. Neb. 2004).
165. See, e.g., Motley v. United States, 295 F.3d 820, 822 (8th Cir. 2002); Hughes v.
United States, 263 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2001); Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639,
640 (8th Cir. 1991); Arthur v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 2d 431, 434 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Diltz
v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 95, 97 (D. Del. 1991). In one case, the Eighth Circuit did hold
that § 2401(b) was a jurisdictional prerequisite. McCoy v. United States, 264 F.3d 792, 794
(8th Cir. 2001). The court's position in McCoy, however, was based on a misreading of an
earlier Eighth Circuit case which stated that "[f]or a district court to have jurisdiction over a
claim in an FTCA suit, the claim must first have been presented to the appropriate federal
agency." Walker v. United States, 176 F.3d 437, 438 (8th Cir. 1999). Although the court in
McCoy cited Walker as support for the proposition that § 2401(b) was jurisdictional, the
Walker court did not address whether the limitations period set out in § 2401(b) was a
jurisdictional prerequisite or not. See id.
166. See, e.g., Schmidt, 933 F.2d at 640.
167. Hughes, 263 F.3d at 273.
168. Id. at 273-74.
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diagnosed quickly enough and treated with anticoagulants, Hughes could
have avoided amputation. 169 The question before the Third Circuit was
when Hughes's claim accrued. Hughes contended that his injury was
caused by the doctors' failure to administer anticoagulants and not by the
heparin itself, and thus the statute of limitations did not begin to run until he
was made aware of what caused his injury. 170 Hughes "argue[d] that the
statute of limitations was equitably tolled until he received his hospital
records... [while] the Government argue[d] that Hughes had all relevant
information about his injury and its cause when he was discharged."' 17 1 The
Third Circuit held that because § 2401(b) is an affirmative defense the
government carried the burden of "establish[ing] the date when plaintiff
knew, or reasonably should have known, of the cause of his injury."'172
The Circuit split on how to view § 2401(b) post-Irwin stems largely from
differing views on how Irwin applies to the FTCA. The First, Fourth, and
Seventh Circuits do not see Irwin as a challenge to their view of § 2401(b)
as a jurisdictional prerequisite. The Third and Eighth Circuits, on the other
hand, see Irwin as mandating a change in how § 2401(b) ought to be
approached. These courts hold that § 2401(b) can no longer be considered a
jurisdictional prerequisite and must instead be considered an affirmative
defense. Part II will further explore these contrasting viewpoints.
II. DETAILING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT-§ 2401(B) AS A JURISDICTIONAL
PREREQUISITE OR AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Part II explores the split among the circuits with respect to whether, in
the aftermath of Irwin, § 2401(b) is a jurisdictional prerequisite or an
affirmative defense. Part II.A discusses the arguments supporting
§ 2401(b) as a jurisdictional prerequisite. Part II.B explains the reasons
supporting § 2401(b) as an affirmative defense.
A. Section 2401(b) Is a Jurisdictional Prerequisite to Filing Suit Under the
FTCA
This section presents the reasons that speak in favor of the view that
§ 2401(b) is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Part II.A. 1 explores the view that
Irwin does not alter the fact that § 2401(b) is jurisdictional. Part II.A.2
explains that § 2401(b) is jurisdictional because that provision confers
subject matter jurisdiction on federal district courts to entertain tort claims
against the government. Part II.A.3 examines the argument that, because
§ 2401(b) is nonwaivable, it cannot be an affirmative defense but instead
must be a jurisdictional prerequisite.
169. Id. at 274.
170. Id. at 275.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 278.
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1. Irwin Does Not Change the View that § 2401(b) Is Jurisdictional
While the Supreme Court in Irwin did not explicitly state that limitations
periods in statutes that waive sovereign immunity are jurisdictional, the
Court did not indicate that limitations periods are not jurisdictional. 173 The
Court held only that equitable tolling can apply to actions against the
United States in the same way it can apply to actions against private
individuals. 174 Thus, Irwin does not "alter the jurisdictional stature of the
time limitations applicable to the FTCA and other waivers of sovereign
immunity." 175
Richard Parker and Ugo Colella contend that Irwin "contemplates that
limitations periods can be both jurisdictional and susceptible to equitable
tolling."' 76 They maintain that "[l]imitations periods that condition the
United States's consent to suit are necessarily jurisdictional. ' 177 They
argue ftrther that, under Irwin, such limitations periods "may be equitably
tolled if lengthening the time period is consistent with the congressional
intent behind the statute."1 78 Thus, the effect of Irwin is to allow courts to
"consider equitable tolling of time limitations in the context of suits brought
against the federal government while maintaining the jurisdictional quality
of the time limitations."' 79 The First Circuit has held that courts cannot
"determine whether a particular limitations period [can] be tolled by
determining whether the time limit was jurisdictional or not."' 80 In other
words, equitable tolling is a separate inquiry from the inquiry as to whether
time limitations are a jurisdictional prerequisite or whether the time
173. See Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990); Willis v. United States,
879 F. Supp. 889, 891 (C.D. 11. 1994). In fact, Richard Parker and Ugo Colella contend that
the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Brockamp and United States v. Beggerly
"reaffirm the view that limitations periods that condition the United States's waiver of
immunity are jurisdictional prerequisites to suit." Parker & Colella, supra note 115, at 889.
174. Willis, 879 F. Supp. at 891.
175. 1d.; see Johnson v. United States, 906 F. Supp. 1100, 1109 (S.D. W. Va. 1995). As
Ugo Colella and Adam Bain have noted, "even if the FTCA's limitations periods may be
equitably tolled, Irwin simply cannot be read as authority for the proposition that the Act's
limitations periods are affirmative defenses rather than jurisdictional prerequisites to suit."
Colella & Bain, supra note 14, at 2917. Courts that have held that § 2401(b) is not
jurisdictional as a result of Irwin "have ostensibly said that ... [§ 2401(b) is] not [a]
condition[] of the Act's waiver of sovereign immunity." Id. Ugo Colella and Adam Bain
have stated that this view is incorrect: "Because the Act's statute of limitations is a
condition precedent to bringing suit in federal district court, waiver-of-sovereign-immunity
principles compel the conclusion that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional." Id.
176. Parker & Colella, supra note 115, at 898.
177. Id.
178. Id. Richard Parker and Ugo Colella contend that "[a]s long as there is no contrary
legislative intent, equitable tolling does not expand Congress's waiver of immunity beyond
legislatively acceptable limits." Id. They then cite Irwin for the proposition that "[o]nce
Congress has made such a waiver [of sovereign immunity], we think that making the rule of
equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is
applicable to private suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver."
Id. at 893.
179. Willis, 879 F. Supp. at 892.
180. Oropallo v. United States, 994 F.2d 25, 29 n.4 (1st Cir. 1993).
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limitations are an affirmative defense. 181 Whether the statute of limitations
should be equitably tolled is an inquiry into whether plaintiffs "could not
have discovered information essential to [their] suit[s]" despite plaintiffs'
"exercise of reasonable diligence."' 182
Parker and Colella provide a three-part analysis for determining whether
limitations periods in statutes that waive sovereign immunity are subject to
equitable tolling:' 8 3 (1) whether the statute provides for tolling; (2) whether
equitable tolling is consistent with the text and purposes of the statute,
particularly with the limitations provision; and (3) whether either the
legislative history of the "statute or its limitations provisions evince a
congressional intent to permit equitable tolling."' 84  Although these
inquiries are not mutually exclusive, any one of the considerations standing
alone is capable of supporting a determination that equitable tolling is
inappropriate. 185
Parker and Colella contend that applying the three-part analysis to
§ 2401(b) reveals that the two-year limitations period for filing claims
should not be equitably tolled.186 First, they argue that "the FTCA already
contains a tolling provision" by having the statute of limitations begin to
run only when "plaintiffis] [know] or should have known of [their]
injur[ies] and the cause[s] of [those] injur[ies]."' 187 Second, they maintain
that equitable tolling runs contrary to the purpose of the limitations period
in the FTCA, which is "the prompt presentation and resolution of tort
claims against the United States."' 1 8 Third, they contend that the legislative
history indicates that Congress intended that the statute of limitations in the
FTCA not be subject to equitable tolling. 189 As Colella and Adam Bain
181. See id.
182. Gonzalez v. United States, 284 F.3d 281, 291 (1st Cir. 2002). In Kokotis v. United
States Postal Service, the Fourth Circuit stated that "the doctrine of equitable tolling is based
on the view that a defendant should not be encouraged to engage in 'misconduct that
prevents the plaintiff from filing his or her claim on time."' 223 F.3d 275, 281 (4th Cir.
2000) (quoting English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047, 1049 (4th Cir. 1987)). Thus,
"equitable tolling is appropriate only 'where the defendant has wrongfully deceived or
misled the plaintiff in order to conceal the existence of a cause of action."' Id at 280-81
(quoting English, 828 F.2d at 1049).
183. Richard Parker and Ugo Colella have noted that "when answering the equitable-
tolling question, courts should determine whether equitable tolling is consistent with the
statute under review, and not read Irwin for the blanket proposition that equitable tolling is
always proper in cases involving the United States as defendant." Parker & Colella, supra
note 115, at 904.
184. Id. at 901-02.
185. See id, at 902.
186. Id. at 905.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 906 ("Equitable tolling extends the two-year time period in a manner that is
inconsistent with this congressional goal. Even though courts are ostensibly permitted to
extend the two-year time period through application of the 'should have known' prong of the
limitations inquiry, equitable tolling would extend the time even further.").
189. See id. at 907-11; H.R. Rep. No. 81-276, at 2 (1949) ("The committee feel that, in
comparison to analogous State and Federal statutes of limitation, the existing 1-year period is
too short and tends toward injustice in many instances.").
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have noted, "prior to enacting the FTCA in 1946, Congress considered
legislative proposals that contained equitable tolling provisions, but that
when Congress finally enacted the FTCA, it declined to include those
provisions." 190
2. Section 2401(b) Confers Subject Matter Jurisdiction on Federal District
Courts
This section explores the argument that § 2401(b) is jurisdictional
because § 2401(b) is a grant of subject matter jurisdiction. Part I.A.2.a
explains that because waiving sovereign immunity confers jurisdiction, any
provision regarding the waiver, such § 2401(b), is a jurisdictional
prerequisite. Part I.A.2.b discusses the view that Article III of the United
States Constitution impels the conclusion that § 2401(b) is a jurisdictional
prerequisite.
a. The United States's Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Creates Jurisdiction
Because sovereign immunity prevents individuals from bringing suit
against the government, any waiver of sovereign immunity grants courts
jurisdiction to hear claims brought against the government. 191 Thus, only if
plaintiffs satisfy the requirements of § 2401(b) do federal district courts
have jurisdiction to hear tort claims against the federal government. 192
Courts have held that because "[s]overeign immunity is a jurisdictional bar
to suits against the federal government," a condition on any waiver of
sovereign immunity is necessarily jurisdictional. 193 The administrative
filing requirement pursuant to § 2401(b) is a condition on the United
States's waiver of sovereign immunity. 194 Satisfying this condition is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing any tort action against the United
States in federal district court. 195  In Skwira, the First Circuit held
unequivocally that § 2401(b) was a jurisdictional prerequisite to
commencing an action under the FTCA. 196 The court reasoned that the
190. Colella & Bain, supra note 74, at 175.
191. See Parker, supra note 7, at 1.
192. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000); Parker, supra note 7, at 1-2. The "failure to comply
with the FTCA's statute of limitations means that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain the suit and must dismiss it." Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64,
71 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Coska v. United States, 114 F.3d 319, 323 n.8 (1st Cir. 1997)).
193. Heinrich v. Sweet, 44 F. Supp. 2d 408, 414 (D. Mass. 1999); see Block v. North
Dakota ex reL. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983) ("When waiver
legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a condition
on the waiver of sovereign immunity."); Parker & Colella, supra note 115, at 889
("[L]imitations periods that condition the United States's waiver of immunity are
jurisdictional prerequisites to suit.").
194. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979).
195. See Parker, supra note 7, at 1.
196. Skwira, 344 F.3d at 71.
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statute of limitations is one of the express constraints on the United States's
waiver of sovereign immunity. 197
The Third and Eighth Circuits, by implicitly equating the two-year filing
requirement in § 2401(b) with statutes of limitations applicable in cases
where the defendant is not the federal government, reason that the
limitations period in § 2401(b) is an affirmative defense. 198 Yet, these
circuits do not acknowledge that § 2401(b) employs language that other
statutes of limitations do not, specifically that a claim is "forever barred"
unless it is filed with the appropriate federal agency within two years within
which a claim occurs. 199 The "forever barred" language "was intended to
preserve the effect of sovereign immunity itself, which barred the action
entirely." 200 By use of such language, Congress did not intend to authorize
private individuals to commence tort actions against the federal government
beyond the two-year limitation period even if the government fails to raise
the statute of limitations as a defense. 20 1 Interpreting this language any
other way "would effectively allow sovereign immunity to be waived by
[the government, as a party, which it is] ... not empowered to do." 202
b. Article III of the Constitution Compels the Conclusion that § 2401(b) Is
a Jurisdictional Prerequisite
Article III, Section 2, of the United States Constitution provides that the
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.20 3 Congress implements
Article III by statutorily granting the federal courts their jurisdiction, and
Congress may expand that jurisdiction through further enabling legislation,
within the confines of Article III's limitations. 204 Through passage of the
197. See id. at 73; see also United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841 (1986) ("When the
United States consents to be sued, the terms of its waiver of sovereign immunity define the
extent of the court's jurisdiction." (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586
(1941))).
198. See, e.g., Hughes v. United States, 263 F.3d 272, 274-75, 278 (3d Cir. 2001);
Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639, 640 (8th Cir. 1991).
199. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000) with N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214 (McKinney 2003).
200. Maryland v. Sharafeldin, 854 A.2d 1208, 1214 (Md. 2004).
201. See Skwira, 344 F.3d at 73 (noting that any waivers of sovereign immunity
authorized by Congress must be strictly construed).
202. Sharafeldin, 854 A.2d at 1214.
203. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see Colella & Bain, supra note 14, at 2862. Limited
jurisdiction is "[j]urisdiction that is confined to a particular type of case or that may be
exercised only under statutory limits and prescriptions." Black's Law Dictionary, supra note
7, at 869 ("'It is a principle of first importance that the federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction .... The federal courts ... cannot be courts of general jurisdiction. They are
empowered to hear only such cases as are within the judicial power of the United States, as
defined in the Constitution, and have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant by
Congress."' (quoting Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Federal Courts 27 (5th ed. 1994))).
204. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 (1979);
Kanar v. United States, 118 F.3d 527, 529 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that one meaning of
"jurisdiction" is Congress's ability to define the adjudicatory power of the federal courts by
statute). However, Congress has never given the courts as much jurisdiction as Article III
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FTCA, Congress expanded the jurisdiction of the federal courts by granting
the federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over "claims against the
United States, for money damages.., for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment.- 20 5 Initially, the FTCA allowed only tort
claims that were brought within one year of accrual. 20 6 Three years later,
Congress increased the federal courts' adjudicatory power to tort claims
brought within two years of accrual. 20 7 Thus, § 2401 (b) serves as a limit on
Congress's expansion of the federal courts' jurisdiction. Consequently, any
limitation or condition, such as the two-year filing period prescribed by
§ 2401(b), is a prerequisite that must be satisfied before a court can
adjudicate a case. 208 For plaintiffs to assert in their complaints allegations
showing that the court has jurisdiction,20 9 plaintiffs must first satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of § 2401(b).210
3. Because § 2401(b) Is Nonwaivable, It Cannot Be an Affirmative
Defense
The FTCA gives federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction to
adjudicate tort claims brought against the federal government. 211 While
§ 240 1(b) does not itself confer subject matter jurisdiction,212 § 240 1(b) is a
critical element that plaintiffs must satisfy to give the federal courts subject
matter jurisdiction. 213 Courts have consistently held that the requirements
allows. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 320 (5th ed. 2003).
205. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000).
206. See Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, § 420, 60 Stat. 842, 845 (1946) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)).
207. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 81-55, 63 Stat. 62 (1949) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)).
208. See Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 71 (1st Cir. 2003) ("[F]ailure to comply
with the FTCA's statute of limitations means that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain the suit and must dismiss it.").
209. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
210. See Skwira, 344 F.3d at 71; Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir.
1995) ("' [T]he party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court carries the burden of proving
its existence."' (quoting Taber Partners, I v. Merit Builders, Inc., 987 F.2d 57, 60 (1st Cir.
1993))).
211. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
212. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2401(b). Section 1346(b) of the FTCA establishes subject
matter jurisdiction:
[T]he district courts.., shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1,
1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment....
Id. § 1346. Section 2401(b) establishes the limits of this subject matter jurisdiction: "A tort
claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the
appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues ..." Id. § 2401(b).
213. See Skwira, 344 F.3d at 71; supra Part II.A.2.a.
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of § 2401(b) cannot be waived.214 It is well settled that neither a party to a
dispute nor the presiding judge can ever waive subject matter jurisdiction at
any point during the proceeding, no matter how far along the case has
progressed. 215 Because it is beyond dispute that subject matter jurisdiction
can never be waived, and yet, in contrast, affirmative defenses can be
waived,216 § 2401(b) must be jurisdictional.217
B. Section 2401(b) Is an Affirnative Defense
This section presents the reasons in favor of the view that § 2401(b) is an
affirmative defense. Part II.B. 1 explores the position that Irwin compels the
conclusion that § 2401(b) is an affirmative defense. Part II.B.2 explains
that § 2401(b) is an affirmative defense because statutes of limitations have
traditionally been considered affirmative defenses.
1. Irwin Requires Courts View § 2401 (b) as an Affirmative Defense
Relying heavily on the Supreme Court's ruling in Irwin, the Third and
Eighth Circuits maintain that § 2401(b) is an affirmative defense and not a
jurisdictional prerequisite, because equitable tolling of § 2401(b) is not
compatible with viewing § 2401(b) as jurisdictional. 218 In Schmidt v.
United States, the Eighth Circuit held, on remand, that implicit in the
Supreme Court's holding in Irwin that "statutes of limitations in suits
against the government are subject to equitable tolling,"2 19 is that such
statutes of limitations are not jurisdictional prerequisites to commencing
actions against the United States.220 The Eighth Circuit held in Schmidt
that § 2401(b) was a jurisdictional prerequisite and "that the district
court... properly required the Schmidts to establish subject matter
jurisdiction, and that their failure to do so required a dismissal under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)." 221 After granting petitioners writ of certiorari, the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded Schmidt to the Eighth Circuit for
consideration in light of Irwin.222 On remand, in an effort to follow the
Supreme Court's instruction, the Eighth Circuit reversed its earlier decision
as to the jurisdictional nature of § 2401(b).2 23 Furthermore, in Motley v.
United States, the Eighth Circuit held that Schmidt effectively overruled
214. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 284 F.3d 281, 288 (1st Cir. 2002); Kokotis v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 223 F.3d 275, 278 (4th Cir. 2000); Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d 776,
779 (1st Cir. 1992); Crawford v. United States, 796 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1986).
215. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 (1998).
216. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h).
217. See Heinrich v. Sweet, 44 F. Supp. 2d 408, 412 (D. Mass. 1999).
218. See Motley v. United States, 295 F.3d 820, 822 (8th Cir. 2002); Hughes v. United
States, 263 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2001); Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639, 640 (8th
Cir. 1991).
219. Schmidt, 933 F.2d at 640.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See Schmidt v. United States, 498 U.S. 1077 (1991).
223. See Schmidt, 933 F.2d at 640.
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previous Eighth Circuit decisions that had concluded that § 2401(b) was a
jurisdictional prerequisite. 224 Moreover, in discussing § 2401(b) in United
States v. Kubrick, the Supreme Court stated that "[w]e should regard the
plea of limitations as a 'meritorious defense, in itself serving a public
interest."'' 225  Thus, the Court arguably indicated its recognition that
§ 2401(b) was an affirmative defense.
2. Statutes of Limitations Have Traditionally Been Considered Affirmative
Defenses
Statutes of limitations have traditionally been considered affirmative
defenses.226 Every type of action contains a statute of limitations within
which plaintiffs must bring their claims. 227 It is well settled that defendants
must assert the defenses of statutes of limitations either in their answers 228
or in motions to dismiss. 229
In general, state statutes provide that plaintiffs' claims can be dismissed
as time barred only if defendants raise a statute of limitations defense in
their pleadings. 230 For example, in both Ohio and Pennsylvania, the statute
of limitations is listed as an affirmative defense in the Rules of Civil
Procedure that is waived if defendants fail to assert it.231
In litigation under the FTCA, parties must comply with the FRCP.
Pursuant to Rule 8(c), the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. 232
Defendants must affirmatively plead the defense that the claim is time
barred in their answers or in a motion to dismiss, and if defendants fail to
do so they waive this defense. 233  The Third and Eighth Circuits
224. Motley v. United States, 295 F.3d 820, 822 (8th Cir. 2002).
225. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (quoting Guar. Trust Co. v.
United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938)).
226. See, e.g., Haskell v. Wash. Twp., 864 F.2d 1266, 1273 (6th Cir. 1988); Davis v.
Bryan, 810 F.2d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1987) ("The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) that must be asserted in a party's responsive pleading 'at the
earliest possible moment' and is a personal defense that is waived if not promptly pleaded."
(quoting Santos v. Dist. Council, 619 F.2d 963, 967 n.5 (2d Cir. 1980) (citations omitted))).
227. See Glover v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce of N.Y., 141 N.Y.S. 409, 412 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1913) ("It is the policy of the state, as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, that there
shall be a fixed limitation for every cause of action whether legal or equitable.").
228. See Serrano v. Torres, 764 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 1985).
229. See Callico v. Belleville, 99 F. App'x 746, 749 (7th Cir. 2004).
230. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 8(c); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-
613(d) (West 2003) ("[A]ny defense which by other affirmative matter seeks to avoid the
legal effect of or defeat the cause of action set forth in the complaint ... and any ground or
defense, whether affirmative or not, which, if not expressly stated in the pleading, would be
likely to take the opposite party by surprise, must be plainly set forth in the answer or
reply."); Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.03; Ohio R. Civ. P. 8(c); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1030(a)
(West 2002).
231. Ohio R. Civ. P. 8(c); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1030(a); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P.
8(c); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d); 735 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-613(d); Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.03.
232. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
233. See Edwards v. Armstrong, No. 93-5665, 1995 WL 390279, at *7 (6th Cir. June 30,
1995); Haskell v. Wash. Twp., 864 F.2d 1266, 1273 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Since it is a waivable
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consistently hold that, under § 2401 (b), the government bears the burden of
asserting, "as an affirmative defense, that plaintiffs failed to comply with
the limitations period."234
III. NOTWITHSTANDING IR WIN, § 2401 (B) SHOULD BE VIEWED AS AN
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Prior to 1990, courts never analyzed in depth whether § 2401(b) was a
jurisdictional prerequisite or an affirmative defense. Instead, courts,
marching in lock step, relied on the mantra that § 2401(b) was necessarily
jurisdictional because the United States's waiver of sovereign immunity
was conditioned on § 2401(b). This part maintains that the pre-Irwin
approach to § 2401(b) is untenable-§ 2401(b) should be considered an
affirmative defense. Part III.A asserts that the Supreme Court's holding in
Irwin does not require that courts treat § 2401(b) as an affirmative defense.
Notwithstanding the Court's holding in Irwin, Part III.B argues that courts
should view § 2401(b) as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional
prerequisite.
A. Irwin Does Not Require Courts to View § 2401(b) as an Affirmative
Defense
The Supreme Court in Irwin held that there was a rebuttable presumption
of equitable tolling235 in suits brought against the federal government. 236
Misinterpreting Irwin, the Third and Eighth Circuits have held that
§ 2401(b) is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, because if it were, courts
would be unable to employ the doctrine of equitable tolling.237 First,
contrary to the rationale stated by the Third and Eighth Circuits, the
Supreme Court in Irwin did not hold that § 2401(b) was subject to equitable
tolling. The Court held only that equitable tolling could apply to actions
against the United States just as equitable tolling could apply to actions
against private individuals. 238  Furthermore, Irwin did not state that
equitable tolling could or should be read into every statute of limitation in a
waiver of sovereign immunity statute. Also, even if Irwin explicitly held
that § 2401(b) was subject to equitable tolling, § 2401(b) would still not
necessarily be deemed an affirmative defense. 239 As Parker and Colella
defense, it ordinarily is error for a district court to raise the issue sua sponte." (citing Davis
v. Bryan, 810 F.2d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1987))).
234. Motley v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1131 (E.D. Mo. 2001) (citing
Krueger v. Saiki, 19 F.3d 1285, 1286 (8th Cir. 1994)).
235. Whether or not § 2401(b) is subject to equitable tolling after Irwin is beyond the
scope of this Note. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Colella & Bain, supra note
74.
236. See supra text accompanying note 8.
237. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., Willis v. United States, 879 F. Supp. 889, 891-92 (C.D. I11. 1994) ("The
Court does not agree that the effect of Irwin is to alter the jurisdictional statute of the time
limitations applicable to the FTCA ... the Supreme Court would have made explicit in Irwin
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contend, Irwin contemplates statutes of limitations that are "both
jurisdictional and susceptible to equitable tolling. ''240
The Third and Eighth Circuits have incorrectly held that, as a result of
Irwin, § 2401(b) cannot be treated as a jurisdictional prerequisite because
equitable tolling cannot apply to jurisdictional prerequisites. 241 According
to Parker and Colella, whether a limitations period is subject to equitable
tolling is a separate inquiry from whether the limitations period is a
jurisdictional prerequisite or an affirmative defense. 242 Therefore, while
Irwin made it possible for § 2401(b) to be equitably tolled, this does not
mean that § 2401 (b) is necessarily an affirmative defense.
B. Section 2401(b) Is Best Understood as an Affirmative Defense
Prior to 1990, courts failed to give any weight to the proposition that
§ 2401(b) was a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit under the FTCA.
The Third and Eighth Circuits, in interpreting Irwin, have not held that
previous notions of § 2401(b) were incorrect; rather, these circuits in
Schmidt and its progeny have held that Irwin required a change in the legal
landscape. This section argues that while Irwin does not justify viewing
§ 2401(b) as an affirmative defense, both the text of the FTCA and the
traditional understanding of statutes of limitations mandate that § 2401(b)
be viewed as an affirmative defense. This section also contends that
viewing § 2401(b) as a jurisdictional prerequisite is not justified by either
the doctrine of sovereign immunity or public policy.
1. Textual Analysis
A strict textual reading of the FTCA supports the proposition that
§ 2401(b) is an affirmative defense. Section 1346 of the FTCA expressly
waives the United States's immunity from suits in tort, thereby permitting
individuals to bring suit against the United States for injuries caused by the
tortious acts or omissions of governmental employees. 243 Nowhere in this
waiver provision is there mention of the two-year period within which
plaintiffs must file their claims with appropriate federal agencies. 244 In
fact, the FTCA addresses the two-year filing period more than 150 pages
any intent to alter the jurisdictional nature of the time limitations contained in the FTCA and
other waivers of sovereign immunity.").
240. Parker & Colella, supra note 115, at 898, 903; see supra notes 176-79 and
accompanying text.
241. See Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990). It is nevertheless
understandable that courts following Schmidt view § 2401(b) as an affirmative defense
because in Schmidt the Supreme Court instructed the Eighth Circuit to reconsider the case on
remand in light of Irwin. See Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639, 640 (8th Cir. 1991).
242. See Parker & Colella, supra note 115, at 902-11 (addressing the question of whether
§ 2401(b) is a jurisdictional prerequisite or an affirmative defense as separate from the
question of whether § 2401(b) ought to be subject to equitable tolling).




into the statute. 245 Thus, contrary to the understanding of many courts that
the United States's consent to suit is conditioned on § 2401(b), 246 that
section is best understood as applying after the waiver.
If the United States's waiver were conditioned on § 2401(b), § 1346
would contain language indicating that the waiver applies only if plaintiffs
file their claims with the appropriate federal agencies within two years from
when their claims accrue. Florida state law, for example, in its provision
waiving sovereign immunity in tort actions, explicitly states that "the
requirements of notice to the agency and denial of the claim ... are
conditions precedent to maintaining an action. '247 Even in the presence of
such language, Florida courts have not concluded that the filing requirement
is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit against Florida.248
2. Traditional View of Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations have traditionally been considered affirmative
defenses and the FTCA provides no indication that § 2401(b) should be
considered differently from other statutes of limitations.249 In explaining
Rule 8(c) of the FRCP and the meaning of what an affirmative defense is,
law professors often use statutes of limitations as the classic example of an
affirmative defense. 250 The drafters of the FTCA knew that statutes of
limitations are traditionally affirmative defenses. Had the drafters wanted
§ 2401 (b) to be viewed as something other than an affirmative defense, they
could have stated so unambiguously. Just because the defendant in FTCA
actions is the United States government does not alter the longstanding
tradition of classifying statutes of limitations as affirmative defenses. Even
if the FTCA had stated that the United States's waiver of sovereign
immunity was conditioned on § 2401(b), courts could permissibly view
§ 2401(b) as an affirmative defense as demonstrated above.251
245. See id. § 2401 (b).
246. See supra Part II.A.2.a. In United States v. Kubrick, the Supreme Court held that
"the Act waives the immunity of the United States and that in construing the statute of
limitations, which is a condition of that waiver, we should not take it upon ourselves to
extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended." United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S.
111, 117-18 (1979).
247. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.28(6)(b) (West 2005).
248. See, e.g., In re Forfeiture of 1978 Green Datsun Pickup Truck, 475 So. 2d 1007,
1009 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("While a claimant must allege compliance with section
768.28(6) in order to state a cause of action, the failure to do so does not affect subject
matter jurisdiction.").
249. See supra Part II.B.2.
250. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg et al., Tort Law: Responsibilities and Redress 412
(2004) ("Although statutes of limitations do not always make for interesting law school
discussions, they are of the utmost practical importance.").
251. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
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3. Sovereign Immunity Is an Anachronistic Relic of the English Feudal
System
Even though the doctrine of sovereign immunity has a long history in
American jurisprudence, 252 the doctrine does not justify treating § 2401(b)
as a jurisdictional prerequisite. 253  Professor Chemerinsky contends that
sovereign immunity never should have had a place in the American political
system. 254 He believes that sovereign immunity "is an anachronistic relic"
which is inconsistent with both the United States's conception of
government and the United States Constitution.255 Sovereign immunity is
premised on the English maxim that "'the King can do no wrong."' 256 The
federal government, however, is based on a "recognition that the
government and government officials can do wrong and must be held
accountable." 257 Moreover, the doctrine of sovereign immunity undermines
Article VI of the Constitution 258 because the doctrine bars "suits for relief
against government entities." 259
The Supreme Court, in attempting to buttress the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, has repeatedly held that courts are not in the position to interfere
with public administration. 260  Professor Davis criticizes the Court's
position because "courts[,] including the Supreme Court[,] are constantly
interfering with the public administration and constantly stopping the
government in its tracks."'261 Since sovereign immunity has little place in
American jurisprudence today, sovereign immunity cannot present a good
reason for concluding that § 2401 (b) is a jurisdictional prerequisite.
4. Public Policy
Concluding that § 2401(b) is an affirmative defense does not mean that
the government, as the defendant in FTCA actions, is necessarily in a better
position than plaintiffs to prove plaintiffs' noncompliance with § 2401(b).
The facts at issue in Skwira262 provide a good illustration of why plaintiffs
are arguably in a better position than the United States in showing that they
were diligent in filing their claims with administrative agencies.
In Skwira, the First Circuit, in affirming the district court's decision, held
that the Skwira family's cause of action accrued on "November 26, 1996--
252. See supra Part I.A.2.
253. U.S. courts have repeatedly applied the doctrine of sovereign immunity without any
justification. See Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 1201.
254. See id. at 1201-02.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1202.
257. Id.
258. Article VI provides that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
259. Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 1202.
260. Davis, supra note 29, at 401.
261. Id.; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 146-57.
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the day after the autopsy-when the family first learned that Skwira did not
die of a heart attack, as the death certificate and the VAMC had
maintained. '263 The court reasoned that by that date a reasonable person
would have formed a sufficient basis "to believe that there was a causal
connection between the injury (Skwira's death) and the acts or omissions of
a government employee." 264
No matter which side bears the burden, plaintiffs must be diligent in
pursuing their claims in order to bring suit against the United States under
the FTCA. Thus, it is more equitable to ask the plaintiffs to show that they
were diligent in filing their claims rather than to give the government the
difficult burden of proving that the plaintiffs were not sufficiently diligent.
Also, plaintiffs have different levels of sophistication and the facts giving
rise to a claim are unique in each case. Therefore, it makes more sense to
require the plaintiffs to show that they were diligent given the nature of the
case, and the plaintiffs' background and linguistic ability, rather than
require the government, by applying an across-the-board, one-size-fits-all
standard, to show that the plaintiffs failed to exercise diligence.
In Skwira, if the plaintiff had the burden of proving diligence, then the
plaintiff could show how, as the spouse of an alcoholic, it would be
foreseeable that the decedent was vulnerable to a whole host of health risks,
only one of which was myocardial infarction. 265 The plaintiff would not
necessarily conclude that the decedent's death gave rise to a claim merely
by learning that the death certificate was inaccurate. Furthermore, the
Assistant U.S. Attorney's statement to the plaintiff that, although the death
certificate was incorrect, it did not necessarily follow that the decedent died
from unnatural causes, would make the plaintiff even less likely to suspect
that the decedent's death resulted from unlawful activity at the VAMC.
Instead, if the government in Skwira had the burden of proving the
plaintiff's lack of diligence, then the government could point to the
incorrect death certificate as enough to make the plaintiff suspicious of
unlawful activity at the VAMC, without taking into consideration the
decedent's overall health condition.
The same analysis would apply to the Skwira facts if the defendant had
been a private hospital rather than a government-owned hospital-in both
situations, the plaintiff is arguably in a better position to prove compliance
with a statute of limitation. If plaintiffs are better situated to prove
compliance with § 2401(b), then they are always better situated to prove
compliance with applicable statutes of limitations. Nevertheless, statutes of
limitations have traditionally been viewed as affirmative defenses that
263. See Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 71 (Ist Cir. 2003).
264. Id. at 80. By November 1996, the Skwira family had been informed by investigators
of suspicions "about the high number of deaths at the [Veterans Affairs Medical Center],"
and "the autopsy demonstrated conclusively that the cause of death listed on Skwira's death
certificate was incorrect." Id.
265. See id. at 67.
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defendants bear the burden of proving. 266  Neither the text nor the
legislative history of the FTCA indicates any intent for § 2401(b) to be
construed differently from how other statutes of limitations are
construed.267
Accordingly, determining that § 2401(b) is an affirmative defense is not
dispositive as to which party, plaintiff or defendant, is in the better position
to prove compliance or noncompliance with § 2401(b). It is possible that
once the government raises § 2401(b) as a defense, the burden will shift to
the plaintiff, who must at that point demonstrate compliance with
§ 2401(b).268 Thus, the Supreme Court should create a uniform rule to
allocate the burden of persuasion in FTCA cases where compliance with
§ 2401 (b) is in dispute.
As this section demonstrates, § 2401(b) should have been deemed an
affirmative defense ab initio. Although Irwin does not expressly require
that courts consider § 2401(b) to be an affirmative defense, the text of the
FTCA, coupled with traditional treatment of statutes of limitations, do
require that courts view § 2401 (b) as an affirmative defense.
CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court's ruling in Irwin did not necessitate a change in
the way that courts had previously approached § 2401 (b), the ruling led the
Third and Eighth Circuits to properly view § 2401(b) as an affirmative
defense in tort suits brought under the FTCA. Statutes of limitations have
traditionally been viewed as an affirmative defense.269 As this Note
demonstrates, that legal tradition and the text of the FTCA mandate viewing
§ 2401 (b) as an affirmative defense. Furthermore, neither the provisions of
the FTCA nor its legislative history indicates any intent for § 2401(b) to be
construed differently from other statutes of limitations.
266. See supra Part II.B.2.
267. See supra Part III.B. 1.
268. For an interesting discussion on this issue of burden shifting, see generally Colella &
Bain, supra note 14.
269. See supra Part II.B.2.
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